

МЕЖДУНАРОДНЫЕ ОТНОШЕНИЯ, ПОЛИТИКА И ЭКОНОМИКА СТРАН АЗИИ И АФРИКИ

UDC 9

Historical Analysis of the Position of African Countries in the Nigerian Civil War, 1967–1970

A. P. Posibi¹, A. Canale²

¹ Peoples' Friendship University of Russia,
6, ul. Miklukho-Maklaya, Moscow, 117198, Russian Federation,

² University of Palermo,
61, Piazza Marina, Palermo, 90133, Italy

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The Nigerian civil war broke out on July 6, 1967, it was a war fought between the government of Nigeria and the secessionist state of Biafra. Both parties engaged in propaganda activities designed to win the support of the outside world, consequently leading to the internationalization of the conflict. The focus of this study is to historically analyze the nature and dimension of the involvement of African states during the Nigerian civil war, and the consequences in Nigerian foreign relationships after the conflict. To achieve these goals and to understand official foreign reaction by other African states to the conflict in Nigeria, the study firstly explores the federal government's role in international affairs with these countries prior to Biafran secession. Furthermore, this work analyzes the role played by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and its position in the conflict management. Then, the paper observes the way in which Nigerian Government tried to advice and convince other African States that if secession succeeded in Nigeria, these African States could also face the same threat of disintegration. In addition to that, this work wants to put in light other socio-political and economic reasons that led some African countries to be involved into the civil war, backing for one or another side. Concluding, this paper focus its attention on the consequences that such involvements had on the duration of the war and, lastly, on future intrastate relations.

Keywords: African states, Nigerian war, OAU involvement, foreign policies.

Introduction

Nigeria has experienced vast changes, evolving from a collection of ancient kingdoms to a British colony and protectorate to a struggling independent nation. Between the years 1967 and 1970, Nigeria was plunged into a crisis, a civil war. The war began with ethnic rivalry within the military. The Eastern secessionists, Biafrans tagged it a war of independence. But to the Federal Government of Nigeria, it was a war of national unity. The then Government of the eastern region headed by Colonel Emeka Ojukwu unilaterally proclaimed the independence of the region on May 30, 1967 and renamed the region Republic of Biafra. At that time, Lieutenant Yakubu Gowon, a northerner and the head of the Federal Military Government (FMG), immediately ordered mobilization. This Ojukwu's order and Gowon's counter order plunged Nigeria into disorder for about 30 months.

The civil war in Nigeria was predicated by a number of complex combinations of factors, among which are located in the socio-political and constitutional reasons. In fact, right from the colonial days, the unity of the country was on a fragile foundation. As stated by Aluede [1], several of Nigeria's socio-cultural, economic and political challenges are attributable to colonialism. In fact, those to the British colonial master relate to falsely amalgamating the different ethnic nationalities without their consent. Likewise, they did not have any workable program during the colonial period to unify them, because they were not aware of their differences in culture, language, religious, political system and worldview. One of the consequences of this unwise approach was the escalation of cultural, economic and religious issues that led, above all, to the outbreak of the civil war.

Another factor to consider is the role of ethnic groups in the outbreak of the war. Nigeria consists of between 250 to 300 ethnic groups forced to co-exist within the artificial boundaries constructed by Great Britain. However, "only three groups have attained ethnic majority status in their respective regions: the Hausa-Fulani in the north, the Ibo in the southeast, and the Yoruba in the southwest" [2]. For this reason, it's not difficult to imagine how regional and ethnic distinctions within Nigeria have literally torn the country apart. As suggested by Diamond [3] and Russell [4] such ethnicisation of the political scene and, after several coups, an ever clearer polarisation of political positions, even enforced by a growing demand for self-determination, contributed greatly to the secessionist Republic of Biafra. Ultimately, the civil war in Nigeria, as well as in other ethnic conflicts occurred in relatively modern states after independence from colonial powers, can be seen as a consequence of a particular nation-building process. This view is supported by Wimmer's theory according to which, instead of interpreting ethnic conflicts as an expression of uncontrolled 'human nature' or as a necessary stage in universal history, they have to be related to a specific form of state-building: political conflicts take on ethnic forms when the resources of a modern state are unequally distributed along ethnic lines because the process of state formation took place before a strong civil society could be established [5].

To understand official foreign reaction to the conflict in Nigeria, black Africa's richest and most populous country, it's necessary to be aware of the federal government's role in international affairs, in particular the ones with the others African countries, prior to Biafran secession on May 30, 1967. After independence, given the fragility of the country's federal structure, Nigeria's leaders were anxious that the surrounding international environment in West Africa should be conducive to domestic tranquility.

The greatest challenge to Nigeria's views of what would constitute a desirable and feasible level of regional political cooperation was raised by President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, who preached the establishment of an African military high command and continental "union government". Nkrumah's charisma and the aggressiveness of his foreign policy produced a mixture of contempt, envy, and occasional apprehension in Lagos. Although Nigeria's leaders never doubted Nkrumah's lack of realism, they considered his actions to be a threat to international peace and stability in Africa as well as to Nigeria's own internal security and prestige. The main concern of Nigeria's diplomacy in Africa during the early 1960s was thus to isolate Nkrumah and make certain that his initiatives did not shatter the emerging regional consensus or directly subvert the fragile federal coalition in Lagos [6].

Alhaji Balewa, Nigeria's First Prime Minister, on the eve of independence declared that "As the country of the African continent having by far the largest population, we shall inevitably occupy an important position from the moment we become independent... I am confident that Nigeria will prove to be a stabilizing force in Africa". In fact, after independence Nigeria has portrayed an enviable image on the international scene.

Moreover, in his 1960 foreign policy address, Balewa [7] declared: "It is true that Africa is changing every day... but with the good developments are bound to be some bad ones and we are troubled by the signs which we see of the ideological war between the Great Powers of the world creeping into Africa. We shall therefore take steps to persuade the African leaders to take serious note of this distressing trend and we shall make every effort to bring them together, so that we may all find a way to unite our efforts in preventing Africa from becoming an area of crisis and world tension". The statement was indicative of the federal government's pragmatic approach to African unity as a means of achieving greater political independence and security for all nonwhite countries of the region. In pursuit of this objective, the federal government would take the lead in promoting the formation of a Pan-African alliance that, in May 1963, became the Organization of African Unity (OAU). In this context, one of its major contribution to the African unity cause was the institution of the principle of border stability, a key aspect of *uti possidetis* principle, to minimize and peacefully manage African inter-state conflicts. In fact, the OAU resolution declares that 'all Member-States pledge themselves to respect the borders existing on their achievement of national independence' [8]. Therefore, as a matter of political realism, after independence, African governments were virtually unanimous in agreeing that respect for existing European — delineated boundaries should be a guiding principle in inter-African relations. It was felt that any attempt to redraw them could plunge these states into internecine conflicts. "However overtime, the principle of respect for the geographical status quo is expected to proscribe not only irredentist demands at the level of inter-state relations, but also secessionist attempts by purely domestic groups" [9].

Along with the active role played in the establishment of the OAU, Nigeria made also an exemplary contribution to the United Nations Peace Keeping Force in Congo during the first Congo crisis [10]. Indeed, the entire United Nations Force in the Congo was commanded by a Nigerian Major General named J. T. U. Aguiyi Ironsi. It also lent a battalion of troops to Tanzania in 1964 while that country's army was being re-organized.

Furthermore, Nigeria was one of the heaviest benefactors of liberation movements like FRELIMO in Mozambique, the PAIGC in Guinea Bissau, the MPLA in Angola, the

ANC in Zimbabwe (then Southern Rhodesia) and a host of others [11]. Considering the incoming civil war, it's quite clear that the disintegration of such a country could not fail to have repercussions all over Africa.

African countries involvement into the conflict

The Nigerian civil war attracted international attention due to the desire of both the Biafran regime and the federal military government of Nigeria to secure diplomatic support as well as military assistance from the outside world and due partly to the individual reasons various countries of the world had for their involvement in the war.

In this scenario it is interesting to put in evidence the role played by some African countries into the conflict. After the declaration of secession, the Federal Military Government took pains to point out its implications for other African States. It pointed out that if secession succeeded in Nigeria, other African States could also face the threat of disintegration.

Nigerian Government officials tried to convince other African States that balkanization of existing States in Africa would make them more amenable to exploitation by forces external to Africa. In fact, admitting the validity of Biafra's cause would have given rise to trouble and reopened the disputes on the definition of boundaries and the regrouping of ethnic and tribal groups. Moreover, the Federal Government emphasized Nigeria's success over secession would prove to the world that black men could rule themselves.

Not surprisingly, therefore, the majority of the African states backed the federal military government of Nigeria during the civil war. The support for the federal military government of Nigeria, by most African states, was justified by the argument that the break-up of Nigeria would spell the break-up of every other African state.

In fact, according to Cervenka [12], since the boundaries of these states are all artificial and as they contain different tribal groups that have often been in conflict in the past, it was argued that secession of one tribal group in Nigeria would encourage the Somalis in Ethiopia and Kenya, the Ashanti in Ghana, the Baluba in Congo, the Ewes in Dahomey, Togo and so on to make similar attempts.

In addition to the above argument, several African States had individual reasons for the stand they took in the Nigerian war. As reported by Cronje in his work in 1977 [13], there were links between Islam and the support given to Nigeria by some African States. Indeed, Egypt supplied pilots and technicians for the air force. Sudan and Libya who are traditional users of British weaponry, sold to Nigeria some of the equipment which Britain refused to provide [14]. Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia also supported Nigeria.

Niger's support for the federal government was perhaps dictated largely by its economic dependence on Nigeria [15]. This is because for land-locked Niger, the Nigerian railway was vital for getting access to the sea. Similarly, for landlocked Chad, some of her external trade is carried through Nigerian ports [16].

Furthermore, some internal political pressures were important factors that contributed to the stand of some African States. For instance, in the case of Senegal, it was the pressure of the leaders of a powerful religious brotherhood, the Marabouts, on whom President Senghor had been largely dependent for his political survival, that held him back from recognizing the Biafran regime in 1969 [17]. Ghana's role and that of Kenya's towards the Nigerian war could be classified as neutral. Both countries believed that awk-

ward aid or ill-timed action might serve to facilitate intervention of United Nations or some other third party [18; 19].

The OAU's role in the Nigerian civil war was almost a "no-role". The charter of the OAU declares that members are to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of other African states by noninterference in their internal affairs. Accordingly, even though the OAU rejected the federal government's objection to a debate on the war, it generally endorsed the position of the Lagos government that the war was an internal matter. The Federal Government of Nigeria did not want any OAU involvement until it was certain that secession would be condemned. The establishment, in September 1967, of a Consultative Mission made up of the Heads of State of Cameroon, the Congo Democratic Republic, Ethiopia, Ghana, Liberia, and Niger sealed up the organization's support for Nigeria. It also dissuaded the leadership of the Biafran secession from desiring OAU mediation.

Only four African States supported the secessionist "Biafran" Government, and in addition, officially recognized the enclave as a sovereign State: Tanzania on April 13, 1968, Gabon on May 8, 1968, Ivory Coast on May 14, 1968 and Zambia on May 20, 1968 [18]. Nigeria broke diplomatic relations with the four countries, while leaders of other African states accused them of violating the OAU charter.

It is not clear why Tanzania which had enlisted Nigeria's help in 1964 should be the first African country to recognize the "Biafran" Government. Nyerere's decision to recognize Biafra, which he himself admitted had been made with great reluctance, was based on moral grounds. The people of Eastern Nigeria, especially the Igbos, no longer felt secure within the Nigerian federation after tens of thousands of them had been massacred by their fellow countrymen, especially in Northern Nigeria, while the authorities did nothing to stop the pogroms. Therefore, to protect themselves, they decided to withdraw from the federation and establish their own independent state. It would seem that Nyerere, President of Tanzania, did not see the use of force as the best way to solve Nigeria's crisis. He regretted the fact that Nigerian sovereignty was at stake. "The break-up of Nigeria is a terrible thing", he said, but "it is less terrible than that cruel war". On May 20, 1968, Kenneth Kaunda, the President of Zambia, declared that: "The heritage of bitterness stemming of from this horrifying war will make it impossible to create any basis of political unity between Biafra and Nigeria" [20]. In the same occasion, the Zambian Foreign Minister, Reuben C. Kamanga delivered a press statement on Zambia's recognition of Biafra: "Whereas it is our ardent desire to foster African Unity, it would be morally wrong to force anybody into unity founded on blood and bloodshed. For unity to be meaningful and beneficial it must be based on the consent of all parties concerned, offering security and justice to all. The Zambian Government has therefore decided to recognize the Republic of Biafra as a Sovereign and independent state. We hope that the establishment of this Republic will now allow Nigeria and the people of Biafra to work out a better framework for cooperation, in order to ensure a better platform for more realistic unity among themselves, in order to live in peace and to foster African Unity in the spirit of brotherhood and mutual cooperation for the benefit of all the peoples of that region" [21]. Both Tanzania and Zambia claimed to have recognized the secessionist government for humanitarian reasons.

On the other hand, Ivory Coast and Gabon might have succumbed to pressures from the French Government, who openly backed for the Biafran regime. It is not clear how far Presidents Houghouet-Boigny of Ivory Coast and Bongo of Gabon view Nigeria as a threat to them. A large Nigeria may threaten their positions in Western Africa. There is no

doubt that a united Nigeria constitutes a formidable political and economic unit. It was this fact that had at first aroused the misgivings, and even fears, of the smaller West African and Francophone States at the prospect of Nigerian independence. The Ivory Coast in particular and France were both anxious about the growing economic strength of Nigeria and were not averse to exploit her internal tensions [22]. President de Gaulle of France harboured the fear that Nigeria, in view of its potential, might upset the balance of power in the region to the detriment of French influence, by presenting a strong pole of attraction to the impoverished Francophone states around it. De Gaulle, in fact, saw the conflict as a means to weaken the “anglophone giant” of west Africa, which was surrounded by former French colonies closely aligned with Paris, through a policy of defending French interests that would come to be known as *Françafrique*. The term was first used in a positive sense by President Félix Houphouët-Boigny of Côte d’Ivoire, with reference to that country’s economic growth and political stability. However, it is now sometimes used to criticize the allegedly “neocolonial” relationship France has with its African former colonies.

As concerns Gabon, after several meetings with Houphouët Boigny in Paris, president Albert Bongo also declared in May 1968 that “it was utopian to believe that Nigeria with its fifty million inhabitants could remain in its present form” [23]. Throughout her history since independence, Gabon has been subservient to France like most of the Francophone countries on the continent. And her recognition of Biafra was attributed in some quarters to the French government’s influence on her. However, the official position of the Gabonese Government was that it could not maintain “unpardonable indifference towards the pogrom organized against 14 million Africans” [24].

Smock [25] reported that Ivory Coast and Tanzania contributed some amount to relief efforts at Biafra, and recognized the enclave as an independent nation. Humanitarian considerations were not sufficient basis for their action. For instance, other countries that contributed immensely to the relief like U.S.A., Britain, West Germany and even Ethiopia and Liberia among others did not extend recognition to Biafra on the grounds of humanitarianism. Clearly Ivory Coast and Tanzania were acting in line with what they perceived as their national interest. Apart from the fact that the Ivory Coast and Gabon provided channels through which French arms poured into Biafra, it was also known that Tanzania helped the Biafrans marginally in purchasing Von Ronsen’s “minicon” fighter planes and that Zambia gave Ojukwu two DC 3 transport aircrafts [14]. This action could not reduce the suffering of the Biafrans; it only escalated the crisis further.

According to Akinbi [26], in fact, the recognition by the four African States had a momentous impact on the course of events as it had contributed to the prolongation of the war in one way or the other. It provided Biafra with open diplomatic support and credentials and injected new hope into Biafra just when everything seemed without hope in view of the military reverses they had suffered. Thus Ojukwu was expecting more recognition and military assistance which never came. More importantly, the recognition strengthened Biafra’s claim to independent existence and its demand to be treated, on an equal basis with the federal government at the peace talks [12]. This made Biafra intransigent, consequently leading to the failure of all attempts to resolve the conflict through compromise and thereby contributing to the prolongation of the war.

Furthermore, the civil war provided opportunity for South Africa and Rhodesia to help the dismemberment of Nigeria, by throwing their weight on the side of the secessionist group. They supported Biafra and provided covert military assistance. This infuriated

Nigeria and made her review her policies towards these countries. By helping to enkindle a civil war in Africa's most populous and potentially strongest nation, those white supremacist governments undermined African unity, weakened the African liberation movements against themselves and nourished their own propaganda message portraying Black Africa's congenital and incurable instability [17]. It has been indicated that the Rhodesian government was the source of the rockets for Biafran, B-26 bombers and other weapons and that South Africa was supplying arms to Biafra during the war. It has also been alleged and proved that there were South African and Rhodesian mercenaries on both sides of the Nigerian war [14]. On the federal side, they were mainly pilots, while in Biafra they included both airmen and soldiers.

Throughout the war, foreign policy was mostly geared towards keeping the country from total disintegration. The civil war sharpened Nigeria's perception of national security and survival, the importance of good neighbours, the need for diversification of external relations and proper non-alignment, the need for economic integration etc. [27].

Nigeria's relations with Africa and especially with West Africa were severally transformed on account of the experiences from the civil war. Once the war ended, Nigeria had learnt no longer to take for granted, matters it used to treat as peripheral. Relations with the West African sub-region benefited from this changed world view. Unlike in the years before the war, the relations with the immediate neighbours took a greater significance for the survival and unity [28]. Nigerian leader's recognition of this fact was manifested in the improved and closer relation with countries in the sub-region. Gowon realized that its neighbours were the first line of security, and thus should pay more attention to events and occurrences in the territory of its contiguous states [28]. It was this sense of security that brought home the idea of establishing a sub-regional grouping which would provide a common platform for all the states in West Africa cooperate and integrated their economies [29]. In addition to whatever security measure put in place to reduce threats to Nigeria, the government of Nigeria embarked on a policy of good neighbourhood towards the surrounding countries. This policy thrust manifested in Nigeria offering economic aid and technical assistance to a number of West African states. Nigeria constructed roads and bridges for Benin. It provides interest free loans and economic assistance to needy states [29]. Nigeria supplied aid to drought-stricken Niger Republic [30].

Conclusions

This paper has given a historical analysis of the involvement of African states in the Nigerian civil war during the period 1967 to 1970, underlining their positions into the conflict. The nature and dimension of such involvement as well as its implications were also examined.

On the one hand we saw that, during the civil war, the majority of the African states backed the federal military government of Nigeria. This was probably justified by the fact that for most African states the break-up of Nigeria would spell a threat of every other African state's unity. After all, the secession of one tribal group in Nigeria would encourage groups in other African countries to make similar attempts. In addition to this, there were also important economic, political and institutional motives that led most African countries to back for Nigerian government.

On the other hand, only four African countries recognized the secessionist “Biafran” Government: Tanzania, Gabon, Ivory Coast and Zambia: Tanzania and Zambia claimed to have recognized the secessionist government for humanitarian reasons; Gabon and Ivory Coast decision, instead, might be due to pressures from the French Government, who openly backed for the Biafran regime. Beyond that, other countries like Rhodesia and South Africa provided covert assistance: by helping to enkindle a civil war in Africa’s most populous and potentially strongest nation, those white supremacist governments undermined African unity and ultimately weakened the African liberation movements against themselves. The foreign involvement into the civil war had facilitated its prolongation by expecting, on the Biafran side, more recognition and military assistance which never came.

Furthermore, this work with a show of evidence, demonstrated also that the experience of the civil war substantially prepared the ground for Nigerian foreign policy in the year following the conflict.

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Authors' information:

Alore Preye Posibi — PhD Student; posibipreyedavid@yahoo.co.uk

Anna Canale — Master of Science; canaleanna3@gmail.com

Исторический анализ позиции африканских стран в Нигерийской гражданской войне, 1967–1970 гг.

А. П. Посибид¹, А. Канале²

¹ Российский университет дружбы народов,
Российская Федерация, 117198, Москва, ул. Миклухо-Маклая, 6

² Университет Палермо,
Италия, 90133, Палермо, пл. Мариана, 61

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Гражданская война в Нигерии, начавшаяся 6 июля 1967 года, была войной между центральным правительством страны и самопровозглашенным государством Биафра. Обе стороны активно старались заручиться поддержкой внешнего мира, что привело к интернационализации конфликта. Задачей данного исследования является исторический анализ характера и масштабов участия африканских государств в гражданской войне

в Нигерии, а также влияния этого участия на внешние связи Нигерии в послевоенный период. В работе исследуются отношения между федеральным правительством Нигерии и африканскими странами до отделения Биафры. Затем автор анализирует роль, которую сыграла Организация африканского единства (ОАЕ), и подход этой организации к урегулированию данного конфликта. В статье также дается оценка действиям нигерийского правительства на международной арене, в частности, попыткам убедить другие африканские государства в том, что в случае распада Нигерии другие африканские государства также столкнутся с угрозой дезинтеграции. Кроме того, в статье приводятся социально-политические и экономические причины, побудившие отдельные африканские страны вмешаться в гражданскую войну в Нигерии, поддержав ту или иную сторону. Особое внимание автор уделяет оценке влияния внешнего вмешательства на продолжительность вооруженного конфликта и на последующие межгосударственные отношения.

Ключевые слова: африканские государства, нигерийская война, участие ОАЕ, внешняя политика.

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Контактная информация:

Посиби Алоре Прейе — аспирант; posibipreyedavid@yahoo.co.uk

Канале Анна — магистр естественных наук; canaleanna3@gmail.com