The Impact of Global Economic Integration on Africa in the 21st Century

P. F. Adebayo¹, J. G. N. Onyekpe², A. S. Afolabi¹

¹ University of Ilorin, P. M. B. 1515, Ilorin, Kwara State, 240143, Nigeria
² University of Lagos, Akoka, Lagos, 100213, Nigeria


Has global economic integration in the 21st century raised the hope of Africa beyond the traditional approach of providing aid to help her end poverty? Are there remarkable differences in the approaches of some regional economic blocs like BRICS, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and multilateral groups such as IMF, World Bank etc. towards Africa? What has been and should be the basis of bilateral or even, multilateral development relationships between these groups and Africa? To answer the questions, the study explores the philosophy behind the donor-recipient and equal partners’ approaches to development. It juxtaposes the depredatory effects of the socio-political and economic conditionalities that the West has inflicted on Africa (ranging from integrated rural development in the 1970s, to policy reform in the 1980s, to governance in the 1990s, and respect for human rights in the 2000s especially the gay rights movement and so on) and alternative models. The paper observes that the burden of foreign aid, loan agreement, economic and technical cooperation agreement, debt sustainability, etc. have deepened Africa’s vulnerability rather than brighten its prospects in a global market. By hinging its argument on the assumption that any global economic integration that imposes political and economic conditionalities in exchange for aid is anti-development, this paper further submits that African countries should be free to negotiate their own pathway out of poverty as equal partners in development. Only by comparing and exchanging views, rather than tutorials, the more useful engagement between Africa and the rest of the world could become possible. It concludes that mutually–beneficial relations between Africa and economic cooperation blocs will become possible, but only if African governments can take...
hold of these opportunities in ways that will benefit their people. Africa governments should focus on win-win approach that is not about aid but business.

**Keywords:** Africa, Integration, Economic Impact, Globalization.

**Introduction**

The increasingly integrated global economy presents the 21st century African states with both opportunities and complex challenges. Global economic integration is widely thought to improve the allocation of resources, promote technology transfer, and enhance living standards. But, at the same time, global economic integration has frequently been blamed for growing trade imbalances, increased financial market volatility, and less effective domestic macroeconomic policies. Indeed, the rapid opening up and integration of African countries into the world economy to a degree unprecedented in modern history has no doubt brought benefits in several areas, particularly through international trade and investment, even though their incidence varied among and within countries. But it is also true that rapid integration of African economies into the global economic system has also caused dislocations in the continent, particularly among the poor and unprivileged. Thus, the relevance of global economic integration is very persistent issue and recurrent decimal in the continent of Africa, specifically in view of political and economic backwardness. Africa is confronted with deeply rooted level of poverty, minimal share of world trade, and low pace of development in human capital and infrastructure as well as faces with excess of challenges from external pressures. Indeed, programmes for global economic integration have included co-operation in major sectors such as agriculture, transport, energy, and education; and aimed for the establishment of free trade areas, customs unions, and economic unions, and in a few cases for political federations. It is generally felt that progress made on the programmes has invariably been disappointing. Targets have not always been met considering the disparity in the development status of the countries of ‘external initiators’ of this integration agenda and African states.

To this end, ensuring that global economic integration succeeds in Africa is vital, not only because of the prospective and challenges mentioned above, but also because the polices that are required to ensure its fruitfulness are the same as those needed if Africa is to benefit from the process of globalization and integration in to the world economy. Of course, the conventional perspective is that global economic integration in Africa is needed, hoping that it will help in enhancing economic development and growth in the continent. However, there is an unconventional approach to the phenomenon of global economic integration vis-à-vis Africa’s development. The unconventional perspective is hinged on the core-periphery relationship between the ‘facilitators’ of global economic integration and Africa.

Thus, this paper is centered around the contemporary or most recent perspectives on global economic integration initiatives and Africa’s development crises. The paper is organized into five dimensional segments. The first segment is the introduction which x-rays the key or major components of the “generic” and unconventional explanations of global economic integration and development in the continent. The second part presents an overview of global economic integration initiatives or mechanisms in Africa. The third segment of this paper posits and elaborates on the global economic integration approaches towards Africa. The fourth part discusses the basis of bilateral or multilateral development
relationships between global economic integration blocs and the 21st Century Africa. The fifth section of this paper attempts an impact assessment of global economic integration on the 21st Century African states. The last section is the conclusion.

Global Economic Integration Initiatives or Mechanisms in Africa: A Historical Overview

The integration of Africa into the global economic system is not a recent phenomenon. The phenomenon of global economic integration vis-à-vis Africa has commenced for a long time now, before, during and after colonial administration. Without mincing words, the history of global economic integration as it affects African continent can be calibrated into four epochal periods, viz: the period between the middle of the fifteenth century and the middle of the nineteenth century, the period between 1884 and 1960, the period between the beginning of its decolonization in the early 1960s and the end of the Cold War in 1991 and lastly the era of new globalization.

The first phase involved the early commercial integration of Africa through the Tran-Saharan trade and the pillage of Africa during the Trans-Atlantic slave trade. The second phase took place during the period of direct colonial domination of Africa between 1884 and 1960. The third phase took place in the context of the Cold War. Most African states got independence during the cold war and were courted by both warring blocs in the Cold War. The fourth phase is the contemporary stage of new globalization in which capitalism and liberalization is the major pre-conditions for global integration. The integration of African economies into the global economic system has been a product of two major factors, viz: political exigencies and economic imperatives.

The post-cold war period has witnessed an acceleration of the globalization of production and trade. The official statistics would seem to suggest that Africa is a marginal player in this process. Indeed, from all available evidence, the share of Africa in global output, trade, and in international capital flows has declined in the last decade. But while these developments must necessarily be a cause for concern, Afro-pessimism, which has spawned in some quarters is not justified. Despite the hardships that many African countries face, the peoples of Africa have shown tremendous resilience, and have managed to carve out new strategies for their survival and livelihood. These need to be fully taken into account in all assessments of the region's future prospects.

The momentous political changes that have taken place in Africa since the late 1980s signal the dawn of a new era in African politics and provide a context which, if carefully nurtured, could be conducive to a new partnership between Africa and its development cooperation partners. The challenge ahead is for African countries to move beyond the formal structures of electoral democracy towards the construction of a just and sustainable social contract that takes full cognizance of the political and economic aspirations of all citizens. The impressive stride that has been made towards political liberalization and democracy by over thirty countries in the region in the last decade is indeed a cause for optimism about the future.

As to the economic prospects of the continent, a decade and a half of structural adjustment has unleashed changes in the economies of the continent, irrespective of whether the market reforms were successfully implemented or not. The economies of African countries are today much different than a decade back, with the state having withdrawn from the
dominant place it traditionally occupied, and economic liberalization measures having been implemented in many countries. However, economic rationality must be balanced with the maximization of the welfare of the citizenry. The satisfaction of the formal conditions for a market economy is not a guarantee that socially sustainable growth will be delivered in the long-term. Markets can be “captured” and the benefits of economic growth could easily accrue to small elite, rather than being broadly shared. The new economic foundation on which Africa’s development will be built should, therefore, take account of the requirements for growth, equity and transparency as part of a comprehensive package.

Global economic integration approaches towards Africa (donor-recipient and equal-partners approaches to development, win-win approach)

The quest for a new partnership between Africa and its development partners is occurring in a rapidly changing global and regional setting. A number of salient features of this changing setting stand out. On the global scene, the end of the cold war and the exigencies which it had spawned would, on the face of things at least, appear to have reduced the geo-political importance of Africa to the great powers. In the wake of the disappearance of the great East-West divide, new political and economic groupings are being created, with the Africa region seemingly being left out or left to its devises. Sweden itself has been affected by these changes, as it has now become a member of the European Union, with all of the attendant obligations and responsibilities which membership carries [1].

Modern development assistance programs emerged in the post-Second World War environment of decolonization and Cold War competition. The Western, or Northern, analysis of development assistance activities is conducted in the awkward space between the technical functions of development assistance as an instrument of market-oriented development theory and the reality of its inherently political origins and impetus. The current standards and norms to evaluate current donor activity arguably emerge from this Western tradition [2].

Regardless of emerging donor, it is important to note that much of this tradition is embedded within the official coordinating bodies and institutional arrangements of the traditional donors: the Donor Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), as well as international financial institutions such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and regional development banks. Although these agencies are far from absolute in their power to direct donor activity, and are not necessarily homogeneous in their views on development, they are instrumental in defining terms and concepts in development assistance, identifying best practices, and providing a framework within which bilateral donors can interact with a higher degree of synergy than if they had been left to their own devices [3].

It is increasingly recognized that trade liberalization is not sufficient to improve the development prospects of many low-income countries. According to Suwa-Eisenmann and Verdier [4, p. 482], these countries need “not only technical assistance to trade, but, more generally, aid designed to reduce transactions costs of various kinds, many of them ‘behind the border’ and to alleviate the social cost of trade liberalization.”

Generally speaking, the fact that international organization especially WTO give aid to trade to developing countries especially African countries, has been interrogated to be
ostensibly done, given the dynamics and realities of donor-recipient relationship. However, more often than not WTO has reiterated that some of the challenges and current methods to identify the binding constraints hindering developing countries’ capacity to benefit from trade expansion, and highlights some of the considerations that should be taken into account when donor-provided financial assistance — Aid for Trade- is used to tackle them [5].

Furthermore, most developing countries have benefited significantly from WTO Agreements and trade expansion. During the period 1990–2005, their total share in world exports of non-oil manufactures almost doubled from 21.5 percent to 40.2 percent, a remarkable achievement considering that world trade has been growing around three times faster than world output. However, some countries are failing to leverage trade for economic growth and poverty reduction [5].

Having said that, stakeholders from the aid originating regions that is donor regions, and also aid destination regions that is aid recipient’s regions couple with cross-national stakeholder have pondered on demystifying the reasons behind the failed aids to trade which is affecting both the recipients and the givers. Thus, the Diagnostic Trade Integration Study (DTIS) was carried out, which assesses the overall competitiveness of a country’s economy, identifies sectors of greatest export potential, outlines constraints to trade, and presents an Action Matrix. It provides the analytical foundation for policy recommendations and Trade Related Technical Assistance and Capacity Building formulation for the country’s integration into the multilateral trading system.

**The Basis of Bilateral or Multilateral Development Relationships Between Global Economic Integration Blocs and the 21st Century Africa**

The historical origins of development assistance are remarkably similar among all donors-traditional and emerging. China, India, Brazil, and South Africa offer interesting insights into the evolution and motivations of the development assistance programs of emerging donors. Indeed, there is a degree of similarity among the countries in terms of evolution and motivation. There are also indications of important structural differences.

China had three initial motivations for providing assistance to other poor countries: fostering South-South solidarity, strengthening the non-aligned movement, and out-maneuvering politically and diplomatically the Nationalist government in Taiwan. There were clear ideological and political foundations for these motives, including mounting ambitious responses to the Soviet Union in Africa. Later on, however, and especially as China’s industrial growth began to accelerate and the Cold War subside, commercial motivations gained strength as the Chinese government sought to secure access to natural resources. As China’s global role expanded, so too did the reach and magnitude of its assistance.

India’s venture into development assistance activities was arguably later, slower, and more accidental. The country’s initial efforts were limited in scope and size, and were directed primarily toward India’s immediate neighbors, who were considered to be in its sphere of influence and whose stability was important to India. As India began to grow more steadily, it made the transition from an aid recipient to a more significant donor with wider interests. Indeed, India came to see its receipt of assistance as antithetical to its vision of itself as an emerging, self-reliant nation with global ambitions and influence. Consequently, the country has been increasingly less welcome to offers of assistance —
even in the face of humanitarian disasters. Ultimately, and in common with China, the Indian government has come to see its role as a donor as an important facet of its regional hegemony and as representative of its growing global political and commercial ambitions.

In contrast to China and India, Brazil’s development assistance programs seemed to emerge more directly from its affinity with other less-developed countries and less from immediate political or diplomatic ambitions. Instead of being caught up in global and regional struggles over power and traditional left-right ideology, Brazil’s policy seems to have reflected the wider debate between North and South that emerged in the context of the often acrimonious negotiations surrounding the new international economic order. Brazil’s promotion of cooperation among developing countries was also a reflection of its commitment to the non-aligned movement and its periodic adoption of more protectionist and nationalist policies.

South Africa’s development assistance efforts started as an instrument of economic control over the politically and economically unsustainable “homelands”, which were established by the government to maintain its apartheid system. Rising international condemnation of the country’s discriminatory political, social, and economic structure led the minority-rule government to use foreign aid to acquire a measure of diplomatic approval from poor countries, especially African ones. With the end of apartheid, this development assistance program was gradually redirected toward a more collective vision of Africa and African development. Of considerable importance is the country’s emphasis on democratization, good governance, conflict management, and regional integration. Even in the case of South Africa, however, there are hints that commercial interests have gradually crept into its development assistance agenda.

The four countries adopted a public face of development assistance programs that reflects each country’s status as an emerging market. To varying degrees, these public statements of solidarity with the recipients of their assistance mask the same sort of hierarchical roles and mixed motivations that characterize traditional donor-recipient relationships. China emphasizes win-win cooperation, mutual support and respect, and non-interference in domestic affairs as key principles of its development assistance. Brazil, too, eschews the traditional language of donor and recipient, preferring instead the concept of horizontal cooperation. Finally, South Africa has been similarly careful to avoid any hint that its development assistance is an instrument of regional domination. As such, it also emphasizes its role as a partner in the larger program of African “renaissance.” While the same could not be said of India, India however see aids as a public way of asserting its independence both regionally and globally.

South Africa’s programs are — not surprisingly — Afro-centric. The country is closely tied to its immediate neighbors through commercial and monetary links. Indeed, the bulk of South Africa’s financial transfers are made through formal partnering arrangements in the South African Customs Union and the Common Monetary Area. Even excluding these statutory flows, the bulk of its assistance is directed toward members of the South African Development Community (SADC) — although some of these countries, such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), are not immediate neighbours.

Be that as it may, Africa’s friends in business have friendlier relations with the small expatriate business community than it has been established in the aid industry. This may suggest that commercial relationships may be experienced as more equal — or at least as more comfortable — than those between aid donor and recipient.
However, the concept of partnership has been central in EU-Africa relations from early on. The Lomé Convention, signed in 1975 between the European Economic Community and the ACP group, was founded on the principle of “equality between partners, respect for their sovereignty, mutual interest and interdependence” [6]. It was hailed as a good example of partnership for agreements with developing countries, as it introduced the provision of development assistance decided upon by mutual agreement and without conditionalities, and granted non-reciprocal trade preferences to the ACP group [7]. In subsequent amendments economic and political conditionality was introduced, leading to the criticism that the partnership principle had been eroded [8]. The EU’s insistence to replace non-reciprocal trade relations with Free Trade Agreements with the ACP countries was equally seen as a move away from partnership. With non-reciprocal trade preferences, ACP countries enjoyed access to EU markets without having to open their markets for EU products [6].

However, The abolishing of such preference was seen as primarily in the interest of the EU [9]. Nonetheless, the EU continued to use the language of partnership. In 2000, the Lomé Agreement was replaced by the Cotonou Partnership Agreement, which was based on the fundamental principle of “equality of the partners and ownership of the development strategies”. Similarly, with the group of Mediterranean countries, the EU engaged in a Euro-Mediterranean Partnership via the Barcelona Process. The 1995 Barcelona Declaration established a “comprehensive partnership, through strengthened political dialogue on a regular basis, the development of economic and financial cooperation and greater emphasis on the social, cultural and human dimension, multilateral and lasting framework of relations based on a spirit of partnership” [10]. The European Neighborhood Policy (2003) further built on the Barcelona Process and aimed to “work with the partners to reduce poverty and create an area of prosperity and values” [11]. Tellingly, the main financial instrument for the European Neighborhood Policy was called the European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument.

Aid dependence historically permitted donors to shape the African development agenda. Africa is not only dependent on the flow of resources because they are such a large proportion of the total proportion of developing countries, as they have there less developed counterparts in Asia and Americas. However, Africa had little to give in return, and is dependent on the goodwill of aid donors, who could withdraw aid at any time. African recipients may well have had to work harder to keep donors engaged than those in countries or regions with more commercial potential or political significance. The donors stayed, and successive African governments tried to follow their general line. In relation to this, the economic justice principles on which Africa’s war of independence had been fought are abandoned in order to embark on one of the earliest economic reform programmes of any developing country. Huge private foreign-funded organizations were permitted to channel foreign money and ideas directly towards organizing the poor. Therefore, every April, Foreign and Prime Ministers, and presidents of Africa alike show up in Paris to be chastised for their failures and to ask for more aid.

Be that as it may, aid is more important in Africa than before, but the goodwill of donor countries is still needed. In the classic client manner, Africa needs patronage in the international system, for favored trading or immigration status, for recognition, protection from more powerful neighbors and global north hegemons. This can be gained by participation in international organizations such as the Commonwealth, the WTO and the UN, or through careful international relations. Accepting aid may be part of the price
of gaining donor countries’ goodwill. But this also suggests that if the costs of aid are too high — in terms of unpalatable conditions, administrative time and effort, and the discomfort of the personal experience of being a recipient — aid can be declined or stalled.

So much for the larger context springs up a begging question; Has Africa learned anything from this brief glimpse of the real-life, personal relations between donors and recipients? It has put on the table the open secret that donor-recipient relations are difficult or hostile. This is because the receipt of aid is not just about being handed resources and a technical blueprint to guide their use; it also requires submission to outsiders, and to outsiders whose claims are often those of historical domination or superior economic power. Stripped bare, the position of recipient is a position of weakness, clung to for the longer-term protection afforded by the relationship. When aid donors ponder the difficulties of getting their programmes implemented, these may be useful things to keep in mind.

Moral dilemmas are central to the decision-making of thinking donors. Some try to see their responsibilities as being to the poor Africans, but they are ever further removed from any direct contact with this group. They also see that they can only fulfill these responsibilities by working directly with elites, a group with whom they have not to date had a warm relationship. There are powerful pressures in two directions. They are accountable to the taxing public at home, which entails close supervision of how aid is disbursed and spent. But more effective use of aid is also understood to require more national ownership of policymaking, more local control [12]. Accountability to the poor Africans must thus compete with accountability to taxpayers in donor countries.

Indeed, past evaluations of trade-related assistance show that lack of country ownership is an important factor of poor effectiveness [13]. This is not surprising given the potential of trade reforms to undermine the economic power of political elites and other vested interests. The issue is of course particularly relevant for aid-financed activities. In the absence of aid, the launch of reforms requires a modicum of political backing, particularly if they are politically and/or financially costly.

With aid, however, the issue of political commitment becomes critical. The incentive of officials in recipient governments is to maximize aid inflows, in order to maximize their budget. Many donor agencies reward meeting commitments and disbursements targets. Unsurprisingly, recipient countries attempt to formulate projects in ways that are compatible with the donor agencies targets, and attract maximum funding, independently of the real objectives. In the case of budget support and to a lesser extent SWAPs, the extra scope for fungibility means that the divergence of objectives does not necessarily reduce the effectiveness as measured by the recipient’s set of objectives. For project aid, the result is too often very high transaction costs, with both parties unwilling to relinquish control and thus poor effectiveness.

**Impact Assessment of Global Economic Integration on the 21st Century African states**

In the past decades, the economy has become so structurally interdependent that the term “Global” as distinct from “international” has been coined and become widely used. As globalization is often used synonymously with internationalization, the former implicitly goes deeper to emphasize the minimization of the roles of national actors and decreased in the relevance of national borders [14]. With the world becoming a global village or envis-
-aged to be a big customs union, global economic integration implies increased integration of world market for goods and services and capital, which is increasing the permeability of national borders to the flow of technologies, trade capital, information and ideas.

Be that as it may, academic studies had shown that international trade or economic globalization has the potential to lift developing nations out of poverty on a scale that could generate several times any conceivable benefits derived from direct monetary aid. The link between trade and economic growth operate through various channels, including changing the relative prices of tradable goods and the incentives for investment and innovation. Trade acts as a catalyst for economic growth by encouraging investment, efficiently allocating resources and opening markets for those goods that people can produce most competitively. Agriculture is vital in this process because it is the dominant industry in most developing countries including Africa; the rural poor make up of 75 percent of the total population in the developing world and suffer the most from deficiencies in capital and technology [15].

Furthermore, one of the few areas where progress in policy will help Africa reap gains from global trade or economic integration and enhance their potential for sustainable development includes: Agriculture. Agriculture is and has always been a fundamental sector and for many African nations, agriculture is an issue of life and death. Agriculture is critical to the successful development to the region. Ambitious liberalization in this sector can offer big potential gains for all countries. The eventual elimination of trade distorting measures which affects agriculture trade will be a tremendous boost for sustainable development. The World Bank has estimated that phasing out restrictions on agriculture could lead to higher income in developing countries including African countries of some $400 billion by 2015. The gains from these are several times larger than all the debt relief or aids granted to developing countries so far.

Furthermore is the textiles and clothing industry, this is another key sector where African countries have comparative advantage. The full integration of this sector into global economy has a huge potential for generating employment and foreign exchange for many African economies Tariff peaks and tariff escalation: After many rounds of trade negotiations, average tariffs on non-agricultural products have been significantly reduced. But relatively high tariff still remain on some products in which Africa is competitive and tariffs go up as the level of processing increases. Tariff escalation prevents Africa from moving away from dependence on a few commodities. Tariff peaks and tariff escalation must be brought down, if Africa countries are to be able to meaningfully gain from world merchandise trade. Transforming market access opportunities into concrete gains will also depend on the willingness of countries to implement reforms at home to enable their firms to take advantage of market openings abroad [16].

Generally speaking, there is strong evidence that open trade regimes (and more generally open economies) are associated with higher rates of economic growth. On average, open economies grew 3.5 percent annually versus closed economies, which grew at less than one percent annually [17]. Over time, the difference in these two growth rates on the level of incomes is stunning: at a one percent growth rate, it takes 62 years for income to double; at 35 percent income will increase 16 times in 62 years. Even a small annual difference in growth rate can be dramatic. International trade allows countries to specialize in activities where the hold a comparative advantage. Trade extends the market facing local producers, allowing them to take advantage of economies of scale. Trade reform encour-
ages a more efficient allocation of resources and thereby raises incomes, since finding new and better ways of using land, labor and capital is vital to economic growth.

Global economic integration policy, through measures promoting liberalization and efficient regulation, is an efficiency promoting instrument with a dual function. Firstly, by promoting more efficient markets, it ensures better conditions for growth, employment and revenue distribution, which, in turn, helps domestic markets to grow and provide more opportunities for entrepreneurs. Secondly, by making industry more productive and promoting efficiency and access to more competitively priced inputs. It facilitates industry's access to international markets. However, the decline in world export of labor-intensive industrial and agricultural goods will have different implications for different countries, depending on their sectorial production and trade structure [18].

Moreover, greater openness and participation in competitive international trade have increased employment, primarily of skilled labor, in tradable goods sectors. With the expansion of these sectors, unskilled labor has found increased employment opportunities in the non-tradable sectors, such as construction and transportation. The expansion of merchandise trade may also have lessened migrationary pressures. On the other hand, the movement of labor across national boundaries has in many cases lessened production bottlenecks, raising the supply response of recipient economies, and increasing income in the supplying countries through worker remittances. Openness to foreign expertise and management techniques has also greatly improved production efficiency in many developing countries [19].

However, a kin look into the theory of comparative cost advantage or the theory of natural advantage as preached by global economic integration has been of somewhat of disadvantage to African countries, which since colonial period were ewers of gold, diamonds, zinc, irons and other natural resources, but yet have not industrialized but only export these natural resources to the global production, which maintained the colonial economy status quo. Evidences abound that Africa only contribute 3 percent of world global production, which mostly come in natural resources. It is on this note, the some other demerits of the encapsulation of African economy into the dynamics of global economic integration leaks. As explained in previous subsections of these attempt instruments of trade, aids, and capital flows in the vicissitude of global economic integration is strictly business, with each party striving to accrue the juiciest portion of the bargain.

To start with, it is important to note that globalization is not a zero-sum game — it is not necessary for some countries to lose in order that others may gain. But to take advantage of this trend, countries will have to position themselves properly through the right policies. Clearly, those economies that open themselves to trade and capital flows on a free and fair basis and are able to attract international capital will benefit the most from globalization. Open and integrated markets place a premium on good macroeconomic policies, and on the ability to respond quickly and appropriately to changes in the international environment.

The ability of investment capital to seek out the most efficient markets, and for producers and consumers to access the most competitive source, exposes and intensifies existing structural weaknesses in individual economies. Also, with the speedy flow of information, the margin of maneuver for domestic policy is much reduced, and policy mistakes are quickly punished. Indeed, increased capital mobility carries the risk of destabilizing flows and heightened exchange rate volatility, in cases where domestic macroeconomic
policies are inappropriate. And finally, it is clear that countries that fail to participate in this trend toward integration run the risk of being left behind [19]. The foregoing espouses how African countries have been at the receiving end of global economic integration, due to the ubiquitous structural weakness in African economies, despite the positive prospects that lies within global economic integration.

The challenge facing the developing world, and African countries in particular, is to design public policies so as to maximize the potential benefits from globalization, and to minimize the downside risks of destabilization and/or marginalization. None of these policies is new, and most African countries have been implementing them for some time. In particular, sub-Saharan Africa has made substantial progress toward macroeconomic stability.

**Conclusion**

This interrogation suggested that donors are received as patrons in African nations, and also that they, perhaps unwillingly and unwittingly, reproduce these patterns of behavior in certain respects. With recipients of aid they behave as patrons more than they behave as partners. To answer the questions raised in the introduction, this suggests that the social relations and personal behavior of aid donors are not aligned with their official poverty reduction and development goals of these African nations and different international organizations fostering global economic integration, such as the IMF, Paris Club, the WTO, etc. Whether or not these social relations actually impede their official activities is too early to say, and may be a question for donors to address themselves.

If the aid relationship is one of patrons and clients, it is one in which the clients seem poised for exit. One of the solutions to assert a paradigm shift from the client-patron relationship to win-win conditions is that there should be a considerable level of assertiveness among African recipients and a new willingness and capacity to challenge the dominance of donor development agendas. This seems to confirm that at least within the domestic development policy arena, donor money carries less clout than before. A historical example was seen in India in 2003, the multiple time, resource and personal costs of receiving aid may come to outweigh its benefits. Economic growth and development have meant that the foreign policy interests of Africa now extend beyond attracting aid, to the serious global matters of expanding access for trade and markets for African labor.

It is expected that donors in Africa will acclimatize themselves to a weakened power of aid, which will make them adjust their strategies, behavior, and in effect objective of aid accordingly. It is in the increasing emphasis on the need for sweeping African governance reforms, an agenda for which broad and powerful political alliances are needed, that donors begin to realize the need to influence the policy and civil society elites. If they have less power, they could still advocate for pro-poor change. It is here that the coldness of donors towards domestic elites may become significant, as a barrier to exercising such influence.

Finally, African governments will need to actively encourage the participation of civil society in the debate on economic policy, and to seek the broad support of the population for the adjustment efforts. To this end, African governments will need to pursue a more active information policy, explaining the objectives of policies and soliciting the input of those whom the policies are intended to benefit.
References


Received: December 7, 2018
Accepted: March 26, 2019

Author’s information:

Peter F. Adebayo — PhD, Senior Lecturer; peteradebayo@gmail.com, peteradebayo2000@gmail.com
Justin G. N. Onyekpe — PhD, Associate Professor; nkenchonyekpe@yahoo.com
Abiodun S. Afolabi — PhD, Senior Lecturer; abeafolabi@yahoo.com
Влияние глобальной экономической интеграции на Африку в XXI веке

П. Ф. Адебайо1, Д. Г. Н. Оньекпе2, А. С. Афолаби1

1 Университет Илорина,
Нигерия, 240143, Илорин, штат Квара
2 Университет Лагоса,
Нигерия, 100213, Акока, Яба, Лагос


Дала ли глобальная экономическая интеграция в XXI веке надежду Африке выйти за пределы традиционного подхода к оказанию помощи, помогла ли ей покончить с бедностью? Существуют ли значимые различия в подходах различных региональных экономических блоков, таких как БРИКС, АТЭС, и объединений, таких как МВФ, Всемирный банк и т.д., к Африке? Что было и должно быть основой двусторонних и многосторонних отношений между этими объединениями и Африкой? Чтобы ответить на эти вопросы, в статье исследуются различия между подходами «донора и реципиента» и «равных партнеров» к развитию. В статье сопоставляются разрушительные последствия социально-политических и экономических условий, которые Запад навязал Африке (от комплексного развития сельских районов в 1970-х годах до реформы политики в 1980-х годах, управления в 1990-х годах и движения за права человека в 2000-х), и альтернативные модели. В работе отмечается, что бремя иностранной помощи, соглашения о займах, соглашения об экономическом и техническом сотрудничестве усугубили уязвимость Африки, а не улучшили ее перспективы на глобальном рынке. Исходя из предположения о том, что любая глобальная экономическая интеграция, которая навязывает политические и экономические условия в обмен на помощь, является антиразвитием, авторы далее утверждают, что африканские страны должны иметь возможность самостоятельно выбирать путь выхода из нищеты на условиях равного партнерства. Только сравнивая и обмениваясь мнениями, а не учебными пособиями, можно выстроить полезное взаимодействие между Африкой и остальным миром. В заключении делается вывод о том, что взаимовыгодные отношения между Африкой и экономическими блоками возможны, но только в том случае, если правительства африканских стран смогут использовать их таким образом, чтобы это принесло пользу их народам. Правительства стран Африки должны сосредоточиться на взаимовыгодном подхде, искать не помощь, а возможности развивать бизнес.

Ключевые слова: Африка, интеграция, экономический эффект, глобализация.

Статья поступила в редакцию 7 декабря 2018 г., рекомендована к печати 26 марта 2019 г.

Контактная информация:
Адебайо Питер Ф. — PhD, старший преподаватель;
peteradebayo@gmail.com, peteradebayo2000@gmail.com
Оньекпе Джастин Г. Н. — PhD, доцент; nkenchonyekpe@yahoo.com
Афолаби Абиодун С. — PhD, доцент; abeafolabi@yahoo.com