The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) Organizational Structure in Context of Implementation of Peace and Security in Eastern Africa

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The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) was established in 2002 as a long-term structural response to the peace and security challenges across the continent. Unfortunately, Africa, especially the Eastern Africa region is involved in some of the world's longest armed conflicts (DRC, Sudan / South Sudan, Somalia). The region is also occupied by states with vast geographical differences from the Horn of Africa countries, Small Island Developing States to majority of the African Great Lakes region states. The African Union (AU), despite its many attempts, has increasingly faced challenges in its work on conflict resolution and maintaining peace on the continent. Several challenges, for example lack of funds to support the institutions, have been cited over the years, however, one that strikingly misses is the organizational structure of APSA. As such, this article, using Eastern Africa region as a case study, seeks to critically analyse the APSA organizational structure. As a result, the author is able to unravel the gaps that exist in the architecture that does not reflect the distinct features of the region. The author concludes that there is an urgent need to restructure the APSA to offer tailor-made solutions to peace and security challenges that face the region.

Keywords: Eastern Africa, African Union, African Peace and Security Architecture, organizational structure, peace and security, conflict.

Introduction

When the OAU finally revamped itself as the African Union (AU) in 2002, there was renewed hope that Africa would finally be able to resolve its continental security challenges. The revamped AU did not disappoint because 2003 recorded the highest number of ceasefires after 49 ceasefires were concluded in 10 different countries. Additionally, the number of peace agreements exceeded the number of conflicts between 2003 and 2004 [1].

This came after an upsurge of conflicts had been witnessed on the continent in the 1990s, but in the early 2000s, there was a significant reduction. However, in the last decade, there has been a slight increase, especially in violent conflicts, from 37 in 2010 to 46 in 2020, with 2016 recording the highest — 55 [2]. Amidst the accusations that the ability and willingness of African states and non-state actors to intervene has decreased [3], the AU is increasingly facing an emphasis to be accountable for its work on conflict resolution and

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maintaining peace on the continent. The AU established the African Peace and Security Architecture (hereinafter referred to as APSA) in 2002 as a long-term structural response to the peace and security challenges in the continent. Over the years, peacekeeping activities became the dominant theme for the AU, as almost all conflict resolution initiatives resulted in peace keeping missions. As the number of peace keeping missions increased, so did the troops, and in 2010, it reached a historic height when almost 80,000 peacekeeping troops were deployed in Africa across eight missions [1]; however, it has been coupled by a myriad of challenges.

Some of the main challenges noted are lack of coordination with the UN as well as claims by some African states that the UN Security Council does not always respect the AU's views [4]. This has resulted in some claims that the AU is playing a facilitating role to the UN rather than being the dominant player on African issues [5]. Lack of funds is also one of the major challenges as well as REC's inability to surrender sovereignty [6; 7]. Other challenges include questions on how "African" is the African peace and security architecture [3], the AU being undermined on continental issues by external organizations such as NATO as in the case of Libya [8], as well as being undermined by some African states when they unevenly implement the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) decisions and lastly a growing reluctance by the African states and RECs to accept the AU intervention in their own internal crises [9]. However, the latter could be the AU member states own undoing because actually they have informally delegated some decision-making autonomy to the commission yet they are the ones formally responsible for deciding on peace keeping operation mandates [10].

The logical consequence has been to try to address some of these challenges following the concept of "African solutions to African problems" coined in 1992 by the eminent political economist George Ayittey in response to the behaviour of the international community in the crisis in Somalia but now reshaped in accordance with the AU's vision [11]. The AU, realizing the few setbacks embarked on assessing the APSA activities, and two comprehensive reports were unveiled in 2010 [12] and 2015 [13]. During the 50th AU Anniversary in 2013, African leaders resolved not to bequeath the burden of conflicts to the next generation of Africans. Accordingly, they adopted the vision of *silencing the gun*, whose main aim was to end all wars, civil conflicts, gender-based violence, violent conflicts and preventing genocide on the continent by 2020 [14]. In fact, regrettably, we note that in 2020, Africa was the sole continent where political violence rose relative to the previous year [15] and that the *guns are yet to be silenced*. Therefore, in December 2020, the AU decided to extend the *Silencing the Guns* initiative until 2030 [16].

This strengthens the fact that the APSA is still facing challenges; therefore, this paper seeks to unearth challenges previously overlooked by critically analysing the African Peace and Security Architecture organizational structure. By using the Eastern Africa region as a case study, the author provides practical examples of how indeed the APSA organizational structure is its main undoing in its work on the implementation of peace and security in Africa.

Organizational Theory: A Theoretical Framework for Analysis

Max Weber (1864–1920) is not only known for being instrumental in the development of sociology as a discipline, but he is also regarded as the father of organizational

theory that he used mainly in the study of economic institutions [17]. Gradually as modern organizational theory continually developed, in 1959, while still at its infancy level, it was defined as the sociological study to describe and explain or even sometimes predict the interaction between organizations and their external environments [18]. Over time, as the study of international organizations became part of the field of international relations and/or political science, some scholars[1] discoursed on the use of the concept of organizational theory to study international organizations.

Drawing lessons from history, Fosdick [21] used organizational theory to understand international organizational activities, specifically the UN's peacekeeping activities transition from the Cold War era to the post-Cold War era. She developed the cognitive ambiguity model to examine the decision-making process of organizations from one period to the next. This is very important for the current discourse because we are noting the transition of power in the international system from the post-Cold War era to the multipolar era, and the APSA organizational structure has to reflect these changes.

In this regard, we use this model to analyse the OAU/AU decision-making process related to intervention in member states' internal issues. We note that when the OAU was established in 1963, most African states were just gaining independence and were determined to protect their sovereignty hence the principle of non-interference in domestic affairs. As a result, the OAU had no mandate to intervene in internal issues of other states. However, when the OAU was revitalized in 2002 as the AU during the post-Cold War era and drawing lessons from the OAU setbacks in managing conflicts in the region, the AU Constitutive Act, Article 4(h), provides for the unions right in certain cases to intervene in a member state with respect to grave circumstances such as war or genocide as well as the right of a member state to request intervention to restore peace in its territory [22].

Apart from the AU right of intervention in some cases, using the same model, one can underscore the emergence of a multipolar period, which is reflected in the AU and African states development partners. This is reflected in the shift from the traditional Global North countries, which were their main partners in infrastructure financial projects, to Global South states, such as China, as infrastructure development partners. One project that stands out is the African Union Conference centre. In November 2006, China pledged to fund and build the African Union Conference Centre and Office Complex (AUCC) for free as a gesture of friendship during the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) leaders' summit in Beijing [23]. Apart from the continental body (the AU), China also funds other AU regional economic organizations (REC's) infrastructure projects such as the ECOWAS new headquarters building [24].

Aside from models, other scholars decided to critically examine how the organizational architecture of institutions affects their ability to carry out their stated mission, and in doing so, they developed three main arguments:

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[1] See for example, Jonsson applied organizational theory to analyze international organizations and institutions. The application was based on the fact that the international system is not characterized by anarchy but rather an organized society that stems from the political, social and democracy progress of international organizations [19] *such as the UN and some regional organizations such as the EU or NATO, who play a key role in the order of the international system* (author's note); Ness and Brechin noted a gap between the international relations, political science and sociology as a result they integrated their different research agendas and concluded that the institutional environment shapes the organizational structure [20].

First, the organization of institutions matters; organizational architecture provides the mechanisms for institutions to pursue their objectives. Second, not only does organizational architecture matter in carrying out the institutional mandate, but it is also a determining variable of whether institutions will successfully execute their mission. Third, the structure of an organization will determine what states seek from an institution. In other words, institutions provide a valuable good or service, which can be determined by the organizational structure of the institution [25, p. 7].

In essence, the organization structure of an institution is a determinant of the success of an institution because it underpins the decision-making process and approaches by the various organs of the organizations on what strategies to use on the challenges the organization is confronted with.

We build up on the latter application to critically analyse how the AU peace and security organizational structure affects peace and security in Eastern Africa by critically analysing 1. The AU classification of what countries constitute Eastern Africa region visa vie UN and/or its other commissions such as the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA's) yet they are supposed to coordinate in peace, security and economic development of the region. 2. How the APSA political decision-making body, the Peace and Security Council (PSC) member states classification in the various regions in Africa (Northern Africa, Central Africa, Western Africa, Eastern Africa and Southern Africa) affects the participation of the member states in the council. This is particularly so for Burundi and DRC classified in the Central African grouping including their participation in PSC, yet they are members of the East African Stand by Force and SADC brigade, respectively, and not the Central African Stand by force. This affects the PSC decisions when confronted with challenges from a particular region and it requires the member states to make decisions or even vote on the decisions related to a particular state's problem in a specific region. First, despite only requiring a majority vote, it is subject to political constraints that hamper its decisions. This is despite the provision that disallows countries that are being discussed from participating in council meetings concerning them. Such countries are only allowed to make a statement. 3. As we stated, most of the Eastern African regional states belong to various intergovernmental organizations (IOC, ICGLR and NBI) that play a vital role in addressing peace and security challenges in the region, yet they are not part of the APSA structure, as it deals only with the 8 recognised RECs.

Why Eastern Africa

There are several reasons why the author decided to use Eastern Africa as a case study.

First, it is a region occupied by states with vast geographical differences from the Horn of Africa countries, Small Island Developing States to majority of the African Great Lakes region states who span East and Central Africa. As states try to address the different challenges within their borders, the result is overlapping membership in both regional economic communities (RECs) and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). For example, we note that of the eight RECs recognised by the AU; AMU, CEN-SAD, COMESA, EAC, ECCAS, ECOWAS, IGAD and SADC, Eastern African countries belong to 5 of the RECs excluding only ECOWAS, AMU and CEN-SAD (Kenya was a member of the latter until 2013). See Table 1.

Eastern African countries according to the AU and the UN ECA	AU RECs, Standby force and intergovernmental organisations (ICGLR, IOC and NBI) that Eastern African countries are members									
	COMESA	EAC	SADC	ECCAS	IGAD	EASF	SADC Brigade	International Conference on Great Lakes Region (ICGLR)	Indian Ocean Commission (IOC)	Nile Basin Initiative (NBI)
Comoros	✓	—	✓	—	—	✓	—	—	✓	—
Djibouti	✓	—	—	—	✓	✓	—	—	—	—
Eritrea	✓	—	—	—	✓	—	—	—	—	Observer
Ethiopia	✓	—	—	—	✓	✓	—	—	—	✓
Kenya	✓	✓	—	—	✓	✓	—	✓	—	✓
Madagascar	✓	—	✓	—	—	—	✓	—	✓	—
Mauritius (According to the AU, and not in the UNECA classification)	✓	—	✓	—	—	—	✓	—	✓	—
Rwanda	✓	✓	—	✓	—	✓	—	✓	—	✓
Seychelles	✓	—	✓	—	—	✓	—	—	✓	—
Somalia	✓	✓	—	—	✓	✓				
South Sudan	—	✓	—	—	✓	Observer	—	✓	—	✓
Sudan (According to the AU, not in the UNECA classification)	✓	—	—	—	✓	ü	—	✓	—	✓
Tanzania	—	✓	✓	—	—	—	✓	✓	—	✓
Uganda	✓	✓	—	—	✓	✓	—	✓	—	✓
*Burundi According to the UN ECA not the AU classification	✓	✓	—	✓	—	✓	—	✓	—	✓
*DRC (According to the UN ECA not the AU classification	✓	✓	✓	✓	—	—	—	✓	—	✓

* FOMAC (ECCAS Standby force) was not included in the table because none of the regional states are member states.

DRC and Burundi are not in AU's classification of Eastern Africa subregion but according to UNECA they are in Eastern Africa. However, the main reason why these two countries are included is that their security challenges are interlinked with the Eastern Africa region compared to the other Central African states.

The AU classifies Mauritius and Sudan as Eastern Africa but the UN ECA classifies Mauritius within Southern African grouping and Sudan within Northern African grouping.

DRC formerly joined EAC on March 29, 2022, while Somalia formerly joined on November 24, 2023, but since they are yet to actively participate in the EAC, they were excluded in most of the EAC's intricacies.

EGYPT is not on the table as it is not listed as Eastern Africa by any institution but it is a member of the Nile Basin Initiative

Source: Compiled by author based on the African Union and the UN ECA classification of Eastern Africa states.

Even though the issue of overlapping membership has greatly been researched, what is often overlooked is Eastern African countries membership in the intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), specifically the ICGLR, the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC) and the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI), that play a crucial role in the peace and security matters in the region, in some instances even more so than the RECs. For example, the ICGLR was established based on the recognition that political instability and conflicts in these countries — specifically the second Congo war — have a considerable regional dimension and thus require a concerted effort from the regional states (who span from East and Central up to the Southern African region) to promote sustainable peace and development. The IOC plays a crucial role in peace efforts on the Island Nations, for example during the Madagascar political crisis that lasted from 2009 to 2013.

The Eastern African member states are also members of two regional standby forces EASF and SADC Brigades (Table 1). However, as we critically analyse, the decision to belong to one over the other is a challenge as some of the member states represent different regions in the peace and security council and it has led to less development of some regional forces compared to others. This is further complicated by some members belonging to a standby force politically governed by another REC for example Seychelles and Comoros belonging to EASF which is arguably politically governed by EAC and IGAD and they are not members of either but instead members of SADC which politically governs the SADC brigade.

Second, generally, the AU security strategies has been dominated by land-based conflicts, often neglecting maritime threats, yet these are the main security threats, particularly for the Small Islands States [26]. The western Indian Ocean comprises the Eastern Africa coastal states of Kenya, Tanzania, and Somalia as well as the island states of Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius, and Seychelles and the overseas French territories of Mayotte and Reunion, so maritime threats are of direct security interest in the region. This neglect by the AU has been interpreted to mean that their security interests are not important for the AU, and the result is that they have tended to build stronger ties with countries outside the continent [27].

This is reflected in the African Maritime Architecture developed so far. The Djibouti code of conduct [28], which is regarded as one of the main pillars of maritime security in the African continent, yet some of the main signatories are Arabian Peninsula states, such as Saudi Arabia and Oman, which are not African states[2].

Apart from the Djibouti Code, Africa also has the Yaoundé Code of Conduct [29], which was signed in 2013 by 25 countries in West and Central Africa, including Burundi

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[2] The conduct was signed by representatives of Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Maldives, Seychelles, Somalia, the United Republic of Tanzania and Yemen, Comoros, Egypt, Eritrea, Jordan, Mauritius, Mozambique, Oman, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Sudan and the United Arab Emirates [28].

and the Democratic Republic of Congo[3]. We note that despite the AU grouping Burundi and DRC as Central African states, these two states are more active in Eastern and Southern African RECs (EAC and SADC, respectively) as well their standby forces (EASF and SADC brigade, respectively) and not the Central African RECs or its standby force — FOMAC (Table 1), keeping in mind that they conduct most of their trade through the Indian Ocean and not the Atlantic Ocean. Therefore, these countries should be interested in security threats in the Indian Ocean as well because they will be affected. DRC, for example, imports mainly from Western Indian Ocean states such as Kenya, Tanzania and South Africa. Similar observations are made for Burundi as it imports from the same Western Indian Ocean states.

The AU also developed the African Charter on Maritime Security and Safety and Development in Africa, commonly referred to as the Lomé Charter, which was adopted on October 15, 2016. It will enter into force thirty (30) days after the deposit of the fifteenth (15th) instrument of ratification; however, as of April 2023, it has only received 35 signatures, 3 ratifications (Benin, Senegal and Togo) and 3 deposits of the instruments of ratification from the same states out of the 55 AU member states [30]. This reflects African states, including Eastern African states' nonchalant attitude towards maritime security. Despite maritime threats being one of their main security concerns in the region, out the 35 signatories 11 out the 16 Eastern African states (see Table 1), have signed, excluding Eritrea, Ethiopia, Mauritius (one of the small island states) South Sudan and Uganda; however, none of the Eastern African states have either ratified or deposited the instruments of ratification [30]. See Table 2.

Last, the main reason for using Eastern Africa as a case study is that it is a region that has been characterized by almost all types of conflicts from transnational terrorism. For example, Al-Qaeda* 1998 simultaneous attacks on United States Embassy in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania and the United States Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya), civil wars (e. g., Rwanda civil wars that resulted in genocide), severe ethnic clashes (e. g., in Burundi and Kenya), major wars (the most notable is the second Congo war sometimes referred to as the African Great War) and the longest conflicts ever Somalia and Sudan/South Sudan. All these conflicts have resulted in proxy wars and/or cross-border conflicts.

However, what has often been neglected by both state and non-state actors are the conflicts due to natural resources exacerbated by climate change, especially water and pasture. As Former UN sec gen Kofi Annan quite rightly noted in 2002, "By 2025, two-thirds of the world's population is likely to live in countries with moderate or severe water shortages. Fierce national competition over water resources has prompted fears that water issues contain the seeds of violent conflict" [31].

There was a follow-up of similar predictions specifically to Eastern Africa by some scholars, such as Okumu, who predicted that "there are heightened tensions and increasing potential for inter-state conflicts in Eastern Africa due to growing discoveries, or rumours of existence, of natural resources on borders or in borderlands" [32, p. 279]. This prediction is becoming more evident in the recent past, with several disputes that if not

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[3] The signatories are Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, the Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo [29].
    * Organization is recognized as an extremist in the Russian Federation.

Table 2. **List of Eastern African countries that have signed, ratified/acceded to the African Charter on Maritime Security and Safety and Development in Africa (Lomé Charter) as of April 2023**

Eastern African Countries according to AU and UNECA	Date of Signature	Date of Ratification	Date Deposited
Comoros	January 29, 2018	—	—
Djibouti	October 15, 2016	—	—
Eritrea	—	—	—
Ethiopia	—	—	—
Kenya	October 15, 2016	—	—
Madagascar	October 15, 2016	—	—
Mauritius (According to AU not in UNECA classification)	—	—	—
Rwanda	October 15, 2016	—	—
Seychelles	October 15, 2016	—	—
Somalia	October 15, 2016	—	—
South Sudan	—	—	—
Sudan (According to AU not in UNECA Classification)	October 15, 2016	—	—
Tanzania	October 15, 2016	—	—
Uganda	—	—	—
Burundi (According to UNECA not AU classification)	October 15, 2016	—	—
DRC (According to UNECA not AU classification)	October 15, 2016	—	—
Total countries: 16	Signatures: 11	Ratification: 0	Deposited: 0

Source: compiled by the author from African Union documents. Available at: https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/37286-sl-AFRICAN_CHARTER_ON_MARITIME_SECURITY_AND_SAFETY_AND_DEVELOPMENT_IN_AFRICA_LOME_CHARTER. pdf (accessed: 16.05.2023)

managed well have the potential to degenerate to full-scale conflicts, such as the Kenya Uganda dispute over Migingo Island in Lake Victoria over its resources as well as the Kenya Somalia maritime dispute in pursuit of Blue Economy potentials in the Indian Ocean [33].

It is, however, important to note that conflicts over water and pasture sometimes also described as pastoral conflicts are not new in the Eastern African region. African pastoral communities inhabit over 21 countries in Africa, however, most of them are located in Eastern Africa (in East Africa and the Horn of Africa) [34]. These pastoral communities fight over the resources have been ongoing for generations as far back as independence, for example, the Ilemi Triangle conflict, where Ethiopia, Kenya and previously Sudan but currently South Sudan borders meet, is inhabited by several pastoral communities; Ethiopia and Somalia 1977 to 1978 conflict over water and pasture in the Ogaden region, which can be argued spiraled into the ongoing conflict in Somalia; Kenya's Pokot com-

munity and Uganda's Karamajong's community decade-long conflicts over pasture and cross-border cattle raiding; and Tanzania and Kenya Maasai's communities over pasture in their border regions.

Despite the fact that these conflicts have resulted in thousands of deaths over the years and that most of the countries belong to the same RECs, e. g., Kenya Uganda and Tanzania in EAC, Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia and Somalia in IGAD, whenever issues over resources arise, the spirit of regional integration seems to take a back seat. For example, in 2017, Tanzania embarked on a nationwide crackdown of cattle from outside the country's borders; as a result, it confiscated over 1300 cattle from Kenya for grazing in its borders as well as more than 10,000 cattle from Ugandan and Rwandan herders in its borders. Some EAC ministers made diplomatic efforts to resolve the issue as a block by developing policy guiding relations between the border communities; however, Tanzania ignored such efforts instead it later auctioned the confiscated cattle [35].

The noticeable trend is that either states adopt either a national strategy to solve the situation or a bilateral strategy. National strategies are mainly adopted in cases of cattle raids that are conducted internally. In 2012, Turkana, a pastoral community in Kenya, stole cattle of the Pokot, another pastoral community in Kenya's arid region. The Kenya police service is in charge of law enforcement in Kenya, and it is supported in arid and semiarid rural areas by the Kenya Police Reserve (KPR). The Kenya police were tasked with efforts to recover the stolen cattle. Unfortunately, in their pursuit of the cattle raiders, they came under military style ambush that killed at least 32 Kenyan police in what was called the worst attack on police in Kenya's history [36]. This national strategy is still pursued despite even more attacks on the Kenya police; for example, in 2014, the bandits laid ambush and massacred 21 KPRs and Administration Police [37]. The most recent attack on the police was in March 2022, which resulted in the death of one police officer and three others injured [38].

On the other hand, bilateral strategies are sometimes pursued by states when the conflicts involves communities in the border territories, for example Kenya and Uganda in 2010 after noting that porous borders and small arms proliferation along the South Sudan, Ethiopian and Kenyan borders were among the key drivers of conflict in the region, they deployed their militaries along the border to rid the Karamojong community of Uganda and Pokot community of Kenya of the illegal arms, but the exercise was not successful [39].

We therefore note that there is a lack of regional approach to resolve these pastoral disputes and conflicts through the RECs arguably due to the fact that national interests overshadow regional interests. Therefore, the AU because of its neutrality should take the lead role in resolving these conflicts before they spin out of control. We note that the APSA is yet to take an active role in resolving these types of conflicts in the region instead the pastoral issues are handled by the AU department of Rural Economy and Agriculture that does not feature in the current APSA organizational structure as one of its main organs.

The most notable bubbling conflict is the one over the Nile Basin. If left unchecked it has a potential to result into conflicts that will span almost the whole continent. The Nile River traverses ten countries from Egypt and Sudan (North Africa) to Ethiopia (Horn of Africa) and then South Sudan through Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and DRC (Africa Great Lakes region). Over 550 million people are dependent on shared Nile Basin water and related resources. (7 out of the top 10 countries with the largest population in Africa are in the Nile Basin area; Ethiopia, Egypt, DRC, Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda

and Sudan in that order) [40]. The population is even set to increase further because for example in 2020, Uganda, DRC, Burundi and Tanzania were among the top 10 countries with the highest growth rate of the population of Africa, with the growth rate expected to double in 2050 in Africa [41].

Ethiopia embarked on building a dam on the basin and Sudan and Egypt are disputing over it. We already note that states are undermining the AU mediation efforts, as Egypt and Sudan both called on the U. N. Security Council to help resolve the dispute, but Ethiopia is opposed to any Security Council involvement [42]. EAC countries particularly Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania will be very interested in the outcome of this dispute as they also seek to facilitate the economic development of the Lake Victoria basin which is directly linked to the Nile Basin [43].

It is, however, important to note that, as quite rightly stated by Koffi Annan, the water problems facing the world need not only be a cause of tension but also be a catalyst for cooperation. Therefore, there is an urgent need to cooperate and develop a regional approach over the issues rather than view them at the national level.

All these regional dynamics reflect the peculiarities of the peace and security issues in the region; therefore, it is not surprising that Eastern Africa is described as a region grappled by both armed conflict as a result of the abundance of valuable natural resources particularly "lootable" resources as well as conflict due to the scarcity of important resources [34] such as water and pasture/land. As a result, Eastern Africa is often described as a subregion with the most complex security system that makes its own contribution to the APSA [44].

Consequently, the APSA, by taking a lead role, needs to provide the tools to help prevent and manage conflicts in the region. This can be done by having an all-encompassing organizational approach by incorporating all regional actors in its organizational structure specifically by taking into consideration the importance of the regional intergovernmental organizations (ICGLR, IOC and Nile Basin Initiative — NBI) into its peace and security architecture. Based on this need, this paper critically examines the organizational structure of the APSA, which is in dire need of restructuring to enhance cooperation in peace and security issues in the region.

Organizational Structure Challenges

The AU Peace and Security council (PSC) Protocol provides partnerships between the AU and the UN, however, the UN and the AU classifications of African countries differ greatly because the UN generally classifies Africa into Northern Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa. Under this classification, Sudan according to the UN classification is in Northern Africa, while the AU classifies it under Eastern Africa, and Eastern Africa is classified as Sub-Saharan Africa [45].

In fact, most often than not, the UN security council discusses the security challenges of Northern Africa together with the Middle East that it even has its own special dedicated regional office for the region and not Sub-Saharan Africa [46]. This is already a challenge in itself because the security concerns for Northern Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa are often looked into separately, as they apparently differ; for example, most works on Northern Africa security challenges, especially related to the Arab Spring, do not include Sudan but focus mainly on the Arab Maghreb Union members only.

This strengthens the fact that for the UN and the AU to coordinate cordially, they need to sync their classifications of the AU member states. For example, during Sudan's civil war that lasted over a decade, Kenya an Eastern African country as well as other countries in the region, such as Ethiopia and Uganda, played a major role in peace and security efforts [44] and not the Northern African countries.

This lack of coordination is further substantiated with the current crisis because "since the start of 2019, long-time tensions between the UN Security Council and the African Union Peace and Security Council (AU PSC) over the handling of African crises have broken into the open, as evidenced by friction around how to address this year's political turmoil in Sudan and the upsurge of violence in Libya" [47].

Ideally, the Sudan issue would have been resolved if, for example, both organizations classified it within the same region, i. e., Eastern Africa or Northern Africa. Instead of the two councils bickering, then a regional body would have handled it, and since Sudan is not a member of AMU, then IGAD is the right regional organization to handle the crisis, and the two councils should work with IGAD to resolve the situation.

Second, following further on the AU and the UN coordination, the UN regional commissions such as the UN (Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) need to work hand in hand with the AU within the APSA framework to achieve economic development by coordinating their peace and security efforts.

Economic development is fundamental for peace and security in any part of the world and the AU to facilitate regional economic integration between its members, established the Protocol on Relations between the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and the AU. Under this framework, there are two elements: Committee of Secretariat and Committee on Coordination. The Committee on Coordination comprises the Chairperson of the AU Commission, Chief Executives of the RECs, Executive Secretary of the UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), President of the African Development Bank (AfDB) and Chief Executives of the AU financial institutions. The committee is supposed to provide policy advice and oversight of the implementation of the Protocol as well as to coordinate and monitor progress made by the RECs in meeting the regional integration goal stages detailed in article 6 of the Abuja Treaty [48].

However, as we noted in Table 1, the two, the AU and the UN ECA, have different classifications of the region; for example, Burundi and DRC are in the Eastern Africa region according to UNECA, but according to the AU, they are in central Africa. Similarly, AU classifies Sudan and Mauritius as Eastern African, while according to UNECA, Sudan is in the North Africa Subregional office and Mauritius in the Southern Africa subregional office.

How then are the UN ECA and the AU supposed to coordinate on economic development to enhance peace and security yet they have different classifications of member states in the various regions reflecting their own unique needs? For example, the immediate security concerns in Eastern Africa may vary from the security concerns in some Central African countries, such as Chad or Cameroon, and this will be reflected in their economic development agendas. In the same vein, their needs could be related, but they are classified separately, creating unnecessary hurdles.

UN ECA also works with the RECs within its various identified regions yet, UN ECAs Eastern Africa subregional office, has identified only two RECs EAC and IGAD leaving out ECCAS which has Burundi, DRC and Rwanda as member states but UN ECA extends

its services to ECCAS through its Central African regional office and the three aforementioned states are not classified in the group. These classifications thereby bring forth unnecessary complications when regional strategies need to be adopted.

Third, the PSC is the main political decision-making body in the APSA organizational structure, and according to article 5 of its protocol, it comprises of fifteen (15) member states — ten members elected for a term of two years and five members elected for a term of three years to ensure continuity [49]. The members constitute representations from the five AU regional groupings: Northern Africa (2), Central Africa (3), Western Africa (4), Eastern Africa (3) and Southern Africa (3) [50].

The 40th AU Ordinary Session of the Executive Council held in February 2022 elected fifteen PSC Member States, namely, Cameroon (Central Africa), Djibouti (Eastern Africa), Morocco (Northern Africa), Namibia (Southern Africa), Nigeria (Western Africa), to serve three-year mandates each until 2025, and Burundi and Congo (Central Africa), The Gambia, Ghana and Senegal (Western Africa), South Africa and Zimbabwe (Southern Africa), Tanzania and Uganda (Eastern Africa) and lastly Tunisia a Northern Africa representative, to serve two-year mandates each until 2024 [51].

We therefore note, following the AU classification, that DRC and Burundi represent the central African group in the Peace and Security Council, yet from evidence, most of their security concerns are handled by RECs and stand by forces in Eastern Africa. To put this into context, following Burundi's attempted coup in 2015, the AU through PSC expressed its full support for the mediation efforts of the EAC through EASF to contain the crisis [52]. Less than a month after the DRC officially joined EAC on March 29, 2022, on April 21, 2022, the regional heads of the EAC held a meeting and made the decision to immediately deploy a regional force to restore peace and stability in the DRC, which received approval from the AUC [53].

Ideally, both Burundi and DRC should be members of FOMAC, but the AU to overcome the challenge of overlapping membership only allowed states to participate in one regional force. Interestingly, both opted for standby forces outside Central Africa — Burundi is a member of the EASF, while the DRC is a member of the SADC brigade. As a result, the Central African standby force (FOMAC) is often cited as the least developed standby force in Africa, but the strengthening of the African Standby forces has been weakened further by the establishment of the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC) in 2013 due to ASF's lack of rapid deployment capability [54].

One can then argue that whenever Burundi and/or DRC are council members then the ball shifts in favour of Eastern Africa or sometimes Southern Africa respectively in the PSC but most especially Eastern Africa as both are EAC members the political governing body for EASF and EAC is an active participant in their security issues.

Regional standby forces were established within the framework of RECs for example the SADC brigade is politically governed by SADC, ECOWAS standby force, North African regional capacity and FOMAC were also established within their REC's ECOWAS, AMU and ECCAS respectively. EASF was initially established within the framework of IGAD however differences emerged between some members especially between Kenya and Ethiopia the presumably political leaders in EAC and IGAD. As a result, EASF is the only standby force set up outside any REC [44] or arguably between two RECs, EAC and IGAD.

This show of political dominance between RECs within the same region is surely going to repeat itself. Tanzania and DRC are both in EAC but they are in SADC brigade

politically governed by SADC and not EASF. In case of security concerns in these states that might necessitate a regional force who will the AU back? We have noted that currently DRC have accepted the regional force of EAC most likely because the security concerns are in the border region between DRC and Uganda, but while these might be in favour of DRC taking advantage of its overlapping membership in the two RECs, the fight of dominance will surely emerge. Therefore, we argue that the AU to avoid such eventualities, ICGLR should be strengthened as it has all interested states as members and they will have to work together.

Fourth, we also note how the Island Nations security challenges are quite unique and the Madagascar political crisis (2009–2013) is quite telling. The AU endorsed the SADC decision to be in charge of the crisis [55] because, as we note in Table 1, Madagascar is a member of both the SADC (REC) and SADC brigade.

However, there was so much external interference in this crisis that led to the establishment of the International Group on Madagascar (ICG-M). It comprised of the AU, the COMESA, the EU, the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC), the international organisation of la francophonie, the SADC, the UN, the member states holding chair at the AU and the PSC, the African states who were non-permanent members of UN SC during the crisis and the permanent members [56].

In other words, the Madagascar political crisis expanded the APSA structure to include organizations outside Africa, such as the international organisation of la francophonie, as well as IGOs, specifically the IOC, which is outside its organisational structure. The inclusion of the international organisation of la francophonie is quite telling because during that crisis period (2009–2013), not a single Malagasy sought refuge in any SADC or African country (Table 3). According to UNHCR data statistics, out of the total 1,421 Malagasy refugees between 2009 and 2013, 79 % sought refuge in France, while the rest were either in other EU countries, North America or New Zealand but not Africa [57].

Table 3. **Malagasy refugees pattern during the Madagascar political crisis from 2009 until 2013**

Country of Asylum	Year					Total
	2009	**2010**	**2011**	**2012**	**2013**	
France (EU) 79 %	216	212	223	239	236	1126
USA 5.9 %	15	18	20	17	15	85
Germany (EU) 3.8 %	15	9	12	13	5	54
Canada 3.9 %	10	10	10	10	16	56
New Zealand 2 %	5	7	7	5	5	29
Switzerland 1.75 %	5	5	5	5	5	25
Italy (EU) 1.82 %	5	5	5	5	6	26
Austria (EU) 1 %	0	0	5	5	5	15
Belgium (EU) 0.35 %	0	0	0	0	5	5
Total	271	266	287	299	298	1421

Source: Compiled by the author from UNHCR. Available at: https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/download/?url=Ho5dP3 (accessed: 27.05.2023).

A more or less similar dilemma might be faced by some other island nations, such as Seychelles and Comoros, because even though they are both SADC members, they are not part of its brigade but members of the EASF, so in the case of any security challenges who will the AU endorse the REC or Standby force? Nevertheless, in 2019, ahead of the Comoros presidential and governors' elections, the Eastern Africa Standby Force (EASF) deployed an election observer mission in the Union of Comoros. This might signify the state's national preference, but in regard to security concerns, as exemplified by the Madagascar crisis, other actors might have an interest, necessitating interference.

Fifth, the APSA structure involves other organs; specifically, it mentions the Pan-African Parliament and the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, as well as civil society organizations, but not the Department of Rural Economy and Agriculture, yet it plays a crucial role in resolving pastoral conflicts.

Political and policy contexts in Africa have played a crucial role in shaping pastoralism, and pastoralist populations of varying sizes are found in almost all African countries. These political contexts vary considerably between countries, depending on precolonial, colonial and postcolonial histories and the formal and traditional institutions that have evolved. These diverse institutions govern formal and informal rights to water, land and pasture resources, as well as conflict resolution systems.

In 2010, the department developed a policy framework for pastoralism in Africa that was adopted by the AU executive council in 2011. The framework explicitly states that "the multipurpose socioeconomic and cultural features of pastoralism are better exploited in *East Africa compared to other regions*" [58, p. 10], as we have exemplified as one of the reasons for selecting Eastern Africa as a case study.

However, the most profound statement in the policy framework is that it notes that these conflicts are often settled through traditional conflict management systems such as dialogue with pastoral communities through a conciliation commission made up of herders, farmers, local government representatives and other concerned parties [58].

In all fairness the PSC has noted the importance of the department of rural economy and agriculture and in April 2022 during its meeting on Climate Change, Peace and Security in Africa the AU commissioner for the department was present. However, it is slightly disappointing to note that it is climate change that has led to the inclusion of the department when the security concerns for the pastoral communities have been ongoing since independence.

Therefore, the APSA needs not only needs to integrate the department of rural economy and agriculture as one of its main organs to work with but also needs to incorporate traditional African conflict resolution mechanisms into its organizational structure.

Conclusion

As such, the paper concludes that the APSA needs an overhaul, taking into consideration the specific peculiar regional security threats of each region and encompassing it in its structure. As we have suggested there is a need for uniform classification of states into the various institutions that are vital in peacekeeping coordination efforts from the AU to the UN and its commissions. We also recognised the importance of IGOs, such as ICGLR, IOC and NBI that need to be included in its organizational structure. The PSC

also needs to recognise the states participation in what regions despite their classification and address the situation.

For example, the current ongoing crisis in DRC is a clear example, EASF has no mandate in DRC because DRC is a member of SADC Brigade but since DRC joined EAC they have felt a need to be interested in their security concerns hence the formation of the East Africa community regional force instead of EASF nevertheless Southern African countries are also very interested in the issue hence Luanda process (spearheaded by SADC) taking place concurrently with the EAC Nairobi process exemplifying the complexities of the region.

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Организационная структура Африканской архитектуры мира и безопасности (APSA) в контексте обеспечения мира и безопасности в Восточной Африке

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Африканская архитектура мира и безопасности (APSA) была создана в 2002 году в качестве долгосрочного структурного ответа на вызовы миру и безопасности на всем континенте. К сожалению, Африка, особенно восточноафриканский регион, вовлечена в некоторые из самых продолжительных вооруженных конфликтов в мире (Демократическая Республика Конго, Судан / Южный Судан, Сомали). Регион также населен государствами с огромными географическими различиями — от стран Африканского рога, малых островных развивающихся государств до большинства государств региона Великих Африканских озер. Африканский союз (АС), несмотря на многочисленные попытки разрешения конфликтов и поддержания мира на континенте, все чаще сталкивается с проблемами в своей работе. На протяжении многих лет упоминается ряд проблем, например нехватка средств для поддержки учреждений, однако поразительным образом упускается из виду одна из важнейших функциональных проблем — организационная структура APSA. Таким образом, в данной статье, фокусируясь на регионе Восточной Африки в качестве ареала исследования, автор предпринял попытку критически проанализировать организационную структуру APSA. В результате проведенного исследования автор смог выявить пробелы, существующие в архитектуре APSA, которая не отражает особенностей региона. Автор приходит к выводу, что существует настоятельная необходимость в реструктуризации APSA, чтобы предлагать индивидуальные решения проблем мира и безопасности, с которыми сталкивается регион. Автор также полагает, что существует необходимость единообразной классификации государств по различным институтам, которые играют жизненно важную роль

в усилиях по координации миротворческой деятельности, от Африканского союза до ООН и ее комиссий.

Ключевые слова: Восточная Африка, Африканский союз, архитектура мира и безопасности в Африке, организационная структура, мир и безопасность, конфликт.

К о н т а к т н а я   и н ф о р м а ц и я :

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